762

THE COLLIERY GUARDIAN.

April 9, 1915.

and, fourthly, to lack of storage accommodation at the
depots and among consumers. The demand in London
has been at certain periods, if not greater than usual, at
least greater than it need have been, by reason of “panic”
orders.

Now, it is strange that, since the Committee regard
the shortage of output as the principal cause of
the deficiency of supply, it is this factor that they
have failed to examine even' superficially. Their
excuse is that the question of output at the mines is
now engaging the attention of Sir Bichard
Bedmayne’s Committee; the obvious conclusion is
that they should have awaited the results of the
Chief Inspector’s enquiry, before discussing causes
more remote and recommending remedies that are at
the same time most dubious and most drastic.

Without such knowledge how can the Committee
pretend to make any definite statement on the
subject of cost? Yet this they do: they say they
“have no doubt that the rise is considerably above
the increase in cost of production and distribution,
which can reasonably be put down to the war. The
cost of production at the mine has not, on a high
estimate, risen more' than Is. per ton—one eminent
authority has stated to us that that figure is pre-
posterously high.” The total rise in the cost of
production and distribution has been at most, they
think, 3s. per ton. These are the “facts,” say the
Committee, but they provide us with no proofs.
Instead, we are led to conclude thatr they have dis-
posed of the evidence supplied by the different interests
on the principle that anything that seemed to conflict
with the prejudgment of the Committee might be
safely ignored. The case of the merchants has not
been accepted “without large modifications,” and
the case of the collieries, although correctly stated,
is even more summarily dismissed from consideration,
in this fashion :—

The case of the collieries is that their gains on coal
sold at current prices do little more than offset their
increased expenses on the getting of the coal which they
have to supply at prices fixed by contracts made in the
summer. In order to decide on these contentions, it
would be obviously necessary to ascertain what proportion
of the coal sold by each' particular colliery is sold on
contract, sliding-scale or fixed, and similarly what
proportion of the coal sold by each particular merchant
is purchased and sold by him under contract. Such
figures we have been unable to obtain.

At one or two points we do agree with the
Committee. The capacity for storage in the Metro-
polis might usefully be extended ; this was one of
the lessons of the great coal strike which has passed
unheeded. Again, we are at one with the Committee
in questioning the legality of abating contract
deliveries except under the most exceptional and
pressing conditions, but it is necessary to have
definite proof of the vague assertion that collieries
have withheld deliveries, and, at the same time,
placed more “free” coal on the market. Further,
the Committee seem to have forgotten that the
“strikes” clause includes war.

Coming now to the recommendations. First of
all, there is the proposal to restrict exports ; it is
true that the proposal is whittled down almost to
vanishing point, for it is to be applied only to districts
selling both for domestic uses and export, and to
neutral countries. Our exports of household coal in
1913 were as follow : —

To—	Large.	Through-and- through.	Small.
	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.
Sweden 		17,583	... —	39,001
Denmark 		93,355	—	125,546
Germany		75,029	... —	265,779
Netherlands 		29,223	—	31,884
France 		394,124	... 2,252 ...	25,167
Egypt		63,402	... —	—
Russia		31,701	... —	—
Norway 		19,215	—	—
Belgium		338,680	... —	—
Italy 			56,003	—	—
Unenumerated 		24,580	8	51,879
Total foreign countries	1,142,895	... 2,260 ...	539,256

It will be seen that the whole quantity shipped to
neutrals amounted to about half-a-miIlion tons. It
is scarcely necessary to add that in setting free this
quantity of fuel for the London market—and this
would not be effected —an altogether extravagant
dislocation of trade in all its branches would be
caused.

But there is at least a suggestion—the report is by

no means clear—that the export of other descriptions of
fuel is to be restricted as well. If this be so—if, for
example, exports to the Argentine are interfered
with—two results will most certainly follow: the
cost of all necessities, for the freightage of which we
pay by shipments of coal, will advance: we shall
have to pay more for ores, timber, and wheat: and
we shall at once surrender to America our most
lucrative markets. We believe that this suggestion
to restrict exports was first made by Mr. J. P.
Houlton, a prominent Midland coal owner, but
Mr. Houlton probably failed to appreciate some of
these facts, and, notably, the difficulty of evading
current foreign contracts.

Of the proposals with regard to interned and
enemy vessels we shall say little beyond observing
that the remedy recommended by the Committee—
namely, that the Government should purposely
undercut rates of freights—is one that requires very
much greater consideration than that which the
Committee have extended to it. It may be observed
that such action would not appreciably affect the
international freight market; thus it would provide
the United States with the shipping of which she
is now in need, and for which she is prepared
to pay, without helping the British consumer
to overcome his troubles. The most drastic of
all the threats that are held Over this stricken
industry, however, is that the Government should
consider a scheme for assuming control of the
output of the collieries. The report does not enter
into great detail, and it is difficult to know exactly
what is indicated —whether the State is to acquire
the collieries, or only is to act as factors for the
entire output, or, again, for that portion of the
output solely which is sufficient to satisfy the needs
of the householder in London. The examples of
State control which we have had so far—dyes and
sugar —are not reassuring. We have no desire
to be unsympathetic, but the whole question appears
to have been elevated to a ridiculously high plane.
The impression left upon the minds of the Committee
may be “that the conduct of an industry on which
such great national interests depend cannot safely be
left in a time of crisis to the working of an unregulated
system of supply and demand,” but we shall require
more definite proof that the trust has been abused or
that the remedy lies in State interference, before we
can accept an “impression” of this nature. An
important fact to remember in this connection is that
not one of Mr. Nash’s Committee has the remotest
knowledge of the coal trade in its practical aspects.
The questions of the day demand something more
than trifling and academic discussion.

No national danger has even appeared on the
horizon as yet, but it would be foolish to ignore the
paramount necessity of organising our natural
resources to the best advantage. Fugitive enquiries
and undigested evidence will not help us in this task.
It is not the colliery that requires to be “ controlled,”
but the consumer who begs his trouble half way. In
this connection the danger of future panics may be
largely averted by introducing the system of primes
dlete in regard to prices and rates of carriage, which
has been adopted in France and Belgium for many
years.

In conclusion, we feel compelled to deprecate in
the strongest terms the partisan letter which the
secretary to the Committee has seen fit to address to
the Press witbin a few days of the issue of the
report. ■ This letter is actually headed—in the
Daily News—“The Coal Bamp ” : the case of the
merchants.

A policy of recrimination is some-
Patents times dangerous unless one can be
and sure of having the last word, but, in
the War. the matter of enemy patent rights,
the Government has certainly been
too tender-hearted. In his annual report for 1914,
the Comptroller-General oe Patents recapitulates
the action taken by the Government since the
outbreak of war, and gives a brief exposition of
the point of view. Of the applications to avoid
entered up to the end of last year, in the majority of
cases licences to manufacture have been granted on
the condition of paying a royalty to the Public

Trustee until the Board of Trade order otherwise
Such licences, if not revoked, will continue until,
at the conclusion of the war, a reasonable licence has
been offered to the licensee by the patentee. The
ultimate destination of the royalty will, no doubt,
says the Comptroller-General, be carefully con-
sidered by the Board at the end of the war, when all
the circumstances, including the treatment of British
industrial property in alien enemy countries, will be
taken into account.

The Board of .Trade certainly cannot be accused
of “ frightfulness ” ; indeed, their solicitude for the
German patentee seems to override their considera-
tion for the British manufacturer, and the vagueness
of the intimations as to future policy has opeiated
severely to repress enterprise in this country. The
report states that 172 licences were granted up to
the end of 1914, but if the cases are carefully
examined it will be found that in the majority of
instances, the patents have been continued in favour
of those who were acting as agents of the enemy
firms before the war, and the inference is that they
are merely being “kept warm” for the original
owners. The boast that the Board, by its measures,
has “ secured the continuance of manufacture and
sale in this country of articles which are necessary
for public use and for the public welfare ” simply
means that plans have been devised to dodge the
Trading with the Enemy Act.

The industry of German inventors during recent
years has been phenomenal; during 1913, 2,690
patents were granted in this country to persons
resident in Germany, or nearly a third of those
granted to persons resident in the United Kingdom,
including the colonies, whilst the latter took out
only 704 patents in Germany. We took out 1,706
patents in the United States, as against 1,4 33 taken
taken out by Germans, but in other countries we
lag far in the rear ; thus 2,301 patents were granted
to Germans in Austria (as compared with 373
granted to subjects of His Majesty), 3,067 in France,
(against 1,505), and 1,937 in Switzerland (against
318).

Is it fair, however, to lay the blame. entirely at
the door of the British inventor ? Something may
also be said as to the unintelligent attitude adopted
in this country towards the man of genius—an attitude
in which, as in the case of these temporary rules
referred to above, we can see generosity to the
foreigner running hand-in-hand with harshness to
our own flesh and blood. In an interesting paper
read recently before the Koyal Society of Arts,
Mr. James Gordon recalled a famous case decided so
long ago as 1883, in which the Badische Analinfabrik,
on the strength of an unworked and apparently
unworkable patent, were able to prohibit a British
firm from manufacturing dyes from a successful but
secret process. The results were that this product
thereafter could not be made in this country because
(1) the German patentees did not know how to make
it ; and (2) the British makers were barred by
perpetual injunction ; in the end a factory was set
up in Holland, in which country the German firm
had been unable to secure patent rights. This is
how we cultivate British industry ; for, Mr. Gordon
pointed out, the same thing could happen to-day.

The evils have chiefly sprung from the fact that
aggrieved patentees, of the two courses open to
them, viz., to sue for damages or to apply for a
perpetual injunction, have always chosen the latter,
as it has enabled them securely to block out all
competition, quite regardless of the public need.
The Act of 1907 aimed at overcoming this gross
abuse by introducing the principle of compulsory
working. As a mitigation of the evil, however, the
Act has not been very successful; its application to
the Levinstein case cited above is dubious, and the
judicial procedure necessary to enforce working of a
valuable patent is so involved and so expensive that
in practice the compulsory licence provisions have
had no effect upon the difficulties which arise out of
the perpetual injunction.

Mr. Gordon’s remedy is two-fold. He would give
power to terminate an injunction at any time, and he
would refuse to grant an injunction if the patentee
can obtain adequate relief for infringement from the
defendant. The question is of the most vital