THE COLLIERY GUARDIAN AND JOURNAL OF THE COAL AND IRON TRADES. VoL- CIX. ' FRIDAY, APRIL 9, 1915. No. 2832. Retail Coal Prices. REPORT OF DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE. The report has been issued of the Committee appointed by the Board of Trade to enquire into the causes of the present rise in the retail price of coal sold for domestic use. [Cd. 7866.] The Committee consisted originally of the following, viz., Mr. Vaughan Nash, C.V.O., C.B. (chairman), Prof. W. J. Ashley, Ph.D., Mr. William Crooks, M.P., Mr. John James Dent, Mr. Alfred William Flux, and Mr. Stanley Machin, and the terms of reference were “ to enquire into the causes of the present rise in the retail price of coal sold for domestic use, especially to the poorer classes of consumers in London and other centres.” Mr. James Boyton, M.P., and Mr. James Rowlands, M.P., were subsequently added to the Committee. The Committee have held 15 meetings. In addition to obtaining information from other sources, they have heard evidence from 33 witnesses, including representa- tives of the Government Departments concerned, the railway companies, the London coal merchants, colliery owners, co-operative societies, the gas companies, and the London trolley trade. While within the limits of time at their disposal the Committee have taken account of prices generally throughout the country, attention has been concentrated mainly on London. With some exceptions, the North and the Midlands have not suffered from any very remarkable rise in the price of household coal. In the southern counties, and apart from the additional charges due to the railway rates on a longer haul, prices are governed so largely by London condi- tions that it has been unnecessary for the purposes of the enquiry to deal with them separately. Speaking generally, the Committee have no doubt that the causes which have operated to raise prices in London are also those mainly responsible for the increases in the southern counties and elsewhere. There may, of course, be local reasons for a quite unusual rise, but it would have been impossible for the Committee to consider in detail sporadic variations without . unduly prolonging their enquiry. The Committee feel that their enquiry has been conducted under one considerable difficulty* They have been forced, at various points, to rely on the esti- mates given by witnesses from their personal experience, where it would have been preferable to use the results of statistical enquiry. But they do not think that any corrections in particular figures which might be made if such results were available would materially affect the broad general conclusions at which they have arrived. The text of the report is as follows :—• The Rise in Prices. The amount and dates of the increases in London appear to be as follows if or a typical coal of good quality (“ Best Derbyshire ”) :—On June 16, 1914, the lowest summer price was fixed, 26s. per ton. On September 26 the price rose to 27s.; on November 21 to 28s.; and on December 12 to 29s. On December 19, January 7, January 28, and January 29 prices rose to the extent of Is. on-each date, making the price on January 29 33s. per ton. On February 17 it rose 2s., to 35s. per ton. Tt may be noted that in the winter of 1913-14 the price of this' coal rose from 26s. to 27s. per ton on September 6, 1913, and to 28s. on December 30. In the winter of 1912-13 it rose on September 14, 1912, from 25s. to 27 s.; this price was maintained until, on May 18, 1913, the usual summer reduction occurred. The prices for other descriptions of house coal during the past winter have moved in almost exact correspondence with those specified above, with one important exception. The prices of the lower qualities were steadily levelled up until on January 29 the price for all coal below “ Best Derbyshire ” was 32s., and on February 20 34s. per ton. The difference in price between “ Best Derbyshire ” and “ Stove nuts ” in June 1914 was 6s. per ton; on December 12 4s. 6d. per ton; on February 20 Is. per ton. To put it in another way, the rise from summer prices was 9s. per ton for good, coal, and 14s. per ton for the cheapest quality; the increase above normal winter.prices was 7s. per ton for good coal, and Ils. for the cheapest. It may be as well, however, to . explain here that this phenomenon is not unusual. It has been represented to us that in times of high prices the cheaper kinds of coal tend to rise in price more than the better qualities. We have also reason to believe that recently large quantities of inferior coal which in ordinary times would find no market in London have been supplied to the consumer under one designation or another at very profitable prices. We have had it given in evidence that those who are com- pelled to buy their coal in small quantities are anxious to secure the best quality. They cannot without serious incon- venience use the inferior qualities, because the poor man’s fire has (to serve all purposes, and, above all, it must light quickly. One witness gave evidence to the effect that the coal now being sold from trolleys is worse in quality than usual, as well as higher in price; but the evidence of other witnesses, including the representative of a leading London firm doing a trolley business, was to the opposite, effect. Moreover, a general rise in prices weighs more heavily on the poor, and causes more suffering, because the greater cost of distribution by trolley in small quantities is sufficient by itself to keep the price of such coal above the general level. Up to November 23 last, the trolley price of a high-class coal sold by a leading firm was Is. 4d. per cwt., or at the rate of 26s. 8d. per ton. On November 24 it -rose to Is. 5d. per cwt., or 28s. 4d. per ton; on December 8 to Is. 6d. per cwt., or 30s. a ton; on December 19 to Is. 7d. per cwt., or 31s. 8d. per ton; on January 5 to Is. 8d. per cwt., or 33s. 4d. per ton; on January 26 to Is. 9d. per cwt., or 35s. per ton; on February 1 to Is. lOd. per cwt., or 36s. 8d. per ton; and on February 22 to Is. lid. per cwt., or 38s. 4d. per ton. In certain cases even higher prices were paid, as is proved, by the information which we have obtained- from University settlements and similar institutions working in poor districts. . Deficiency of Supply. Reverting to the main question before us, we have to report that, in our opinion, the initial cause of the increase of recent prices, ranging from 7s. to Ils. per ton, above the winter prices of 1913-14 was a deficiency of supply as com- pared with demand; and, in particular, a deficiency of supply in London. The evidence before us showed that in August there was a lairge and unusual demand for coal, which con- siderably depleted the stocks accumulated by merchants, in accordance with usual practice, to meet the winter demand. It was stated by the merchants’ representatives that in the middle of December these stocks had been reduced almost to vanishing point; and although this statement is difficult to reconcile fully with the returns furnished to the Board of Trade by the merchants themselves,, the stocks were no doubt below the normal. It was stated-, further, that at the same time the railways were bringing up less than the usual quantity for household consumption, and the apprehension of a coal famine caused orders to pour in from consumers who had any storage accommodation. The effect of a temporary failure in the supply of any commodity is normally that the price rises, and rises without relation to the cost of production and distribution. In theory at least such an increase, though apparently arbi- trary, may be expected to perform three functions : it acts as a danger signal, warning consumers to be careful of their . stores; it ensures the distribution of the available supplies to those who are willing to pay most, i.e., pre- sumably to those who have the greatest need; and it auto- matically attracts further supplies, thus providing its own remedy. This system may work satisfactorily in normal times, but the plain fact is that it has broken down m the extraordinary circumstances of the present winter, so far as household coal is concerned. It has no doubt enforced economy among consumers, but it has not ensured distribu- tion where supply Was most needed, because the poor could not afford to pay the prices demanded; and it has not attracted additional supplies with enough speed to prevent much inconvenience and suffering, because either normal supplies were not available, or they could not be brought up. Sliding Scale Contracts and “ Rings.” The mechanism by which prices are fixed and the sum paid by the purchaser is divided between the merchant and the colliery owner presents one curious feature peculiar to London. Some of the best kinds of household coal coming from the Midlands (Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire) are largely sold by the collieries .to the London merchants on what is. known as a sliding scale contract. A pit head price is fixed corresponding to a fixed retail price in London; the colliery owner never gets less than the fixed pit head price, but when the retail price in London rises above that men- tioned in the contract, he receives half the increase. For instance, a contract is made at 10s. 9d. pit head price, corresponding to a retail price of 25s. If the latter falls to 24s., the colliery owner still receives his 10s. 9d. per ton; but he will receive Ils. 3d. if it rises to 26s., Ils. 9d. if it rises to 27s., and so on. The colliery owner has, during the past winter, automatically received 4s. 6d. per ton out of the rise of 9s. from the summer price of coals sold under this kind of contract. It is obvious that this arrangement gives coal owners and merchants a common interest in high prices, while there is no sharing of the loss if prices are low. The merchant is not assisted to reduce prices, to the consumer when supplies are abundant by any reduction in the price he pays to the colliery for his contract coal. The arrangement has, moreover, an important effect on the amount by which London prices must be raised to recoup either colliery owner or merchant for an increase in his costs. If they rise 6d. per ton, -the consumer must be charged Is. per ton extra; for the party whose costs have risen receives only half the increased price. Such a system appears to us indefensible. We have come to the conclusion on the evidence before us that the high prices of household coal are not attributable to /the existence of definitely constituted “ rings ” or close corporations among either coal merchants or colliery owners; but, as in some other trades, there are evidently opportuni- ties of conference among those chiefly concerned, which do in effect commonly lead to concerted action with respect to prices. In the case of prices under the sliding scale system of contract (which a leading witness has told us is practi- cally universal for the best kinds of household coal in London), such conference appears from the evidence to work out in practice on the London Coal Exchange as follows :— A few leading firms decide upon increased prices, which, without more ado, become the “ public prices ” of the day, and are advertised next day in the newspapers. Sliding scale contracts are made on the basis that the price to be paid to the colliery owner varies, not with the retail price actually received by the merchant to whom he supplies the coal, but with these “ public prices,” as advertised. The pit head price rises 6d. per ton on each Is. advance of the “public price,” for all buyers alike; and does not fall for any buyer until the “ public price ” falls. Thus, without any system of penalties on undercutting, the leading mer- chants in fixing prices are secured pro tanto against competi- tion by the fact that any reduction made by’ an outside competitor in his retail price gives him no corresponding reduction in the price which he pays to the colliery owner under the sliding scale contract. Reduction in Output. We have stated that in our opinion the initial cause of the increased prices was a deficiency of supply; but our enquiry would clearly be incomplete without some investi- gation of the causes of this deficiency. The chief is the general reduction of output, due mainly to the large number of miners who have joined the Colours, estimated on good authority at 130,000. The reduction during February, as shown in the returns made to the Board of Trade, was about 12 per cent, of the output of February 1914. Some of the evidence given before the Committee indicated that the reduction in January had been greater than this percentage, but it appears doubtful whether it was so large in earlier months. The output, in and previous to November last probably fell off as much owing to the reduced industrial and export demand for coal as to the lack of capacity for production. In any event, the reduced output would not by 'itself account for the abnormal prices in London and some other centres of population; for there had been, for a time at least, a decrease of consump- tion, and in most centres of the North the rise above normal winter prices has been a relatively small one. Even after allowing for exceptional local causes, such as the powerful co-operative organisations of consumers in some of the northern towns, we do not think that the great difference in favour of some large towns ’as compared with others could have appeared if the only cause of the increase of prices had been so obviously universal as a general reduction of output.. The London Market. The shortage of supplies actually available or “ within sight ” for London (and the same remark is equally appli- cable to other centres, and perhaps even more to many .towns on the southern railways) cannot be' measured by the shortage of output at the collieries. During November and December last, the scarcity of shipping and consequent rise-