JuiA 24, 1914

Supplement to THE COLLIERY GUARDIAN.

xxiii

for a gob fire which broke out near the working face on
April 21, 1909. _ The section was re-opened in April
1911, when the gob fire was found to be still burning,
and it was then finally sealed off by stoppings placed
in the intake and return airways at the outbye end of
the section. Another section of workings in the same
seam immediately to the right of the Coronation section
had since then been advancing, and at the date of the
accident the working faces had reached a point about
33 yds. behind the Coronation faces. This section was
stripping the goaf of the Coronation working, and from
time to time traces of firedamp were found at the
extreme left corner of the working face, i.e., at the point
where it stripped the Coronation goaf, indicating that
this goaf had become flooded with gas. The manager
was not satisfied with the arrangement of the air courses
in the new section, in respect that two ventilating doors
were placed on a haulage road between the intake and
return, and he feared that in the event of these doors
being broken or displaced by a runaway tub or other-
wise, the air would short circuit and cut off the ventila-
tion altogether from the longwall faces. To obviate
this risk, he desired when the new faces overtook the
abandoned Coronation faces, to carry the air along the
face of the Coronation section, and to utilise the old
road on the extreme left of this section as the main
return aircourse. • To determine whether this was
feasible, it was necessary that the Coronation section
should be examined in order to ascertain whether the
gob fire had been completely extinguished. After
careful consultation with his officials, the manager
decided to break through the stopping in the old
road at the extreme left of the Coronation section, and
to have these workings examined and reported upon by
men wearing self-contained breathing apparatus. A
brigade consisting of five trained and certificated men
was assembled. Their apparatus—the Proto—was care-
fully examined at the rescue station, and each set tested
in a smoke chamber charged with dense ammonium
sulphide fumes, when all were found to be in perfect
order. Spare sets of oxygen cylinders and fresh charges
of caustic soda were placed in readiness at the rescue
station, and a stretcher was placed in the cabin at
Kemberton Pit. The brigade descended the shaft at
10.20 a.m., and went inbye to the stopping, a distance
of about 1,000 yds. A hole having been made in the
stopping, the men closed up their apparatus, and Mr.
Charles Cadman, who had trained the brigade and
formed one of their number, again examined each set
of apparatus to see that the wearer had an adequate
supply of oxygen, and that the joints were airtight. The
valves were said to supply two litres of oxygen per
minute, and the gauges showed a pressure of from 85
to 100 atmospheres in each apparatus. They passed
through the stopping at 11 a.m., and on proceeding for
a distance of about 10 yds. found that the air was so
charged with firedamp that the safety lamps were
extinguished. Forty yards further inbye a mouse which
they carried died, and Mr. Cadman then warned the
men of the poisonous nature of the atmosphere which
surrounded them. They proceeded along the level,
walking quietly and carefully, for a distance of 264 yds.
without difficulty, and then passed along the longwall
face for a further distance of 100 yds. The travelling
along the face was difficult, as the seam here had an
inclination of about 22 degs., and although the height of
the working face was about 6ft., the way was blocked
at intervals by falls of coal. Finding that the pressure
of the oxygen in the cylinders had been reduced by about
40 atmospheres, Mr. Cadman deemed it prudent to
return. They retraced their steps for a distance of
about 30 or 40 yds., when deceased was observed to
falter. In his efforts to inhale, he was wrinkling his
cheeks, and it was thought was drawing in external air
at the corners of his mouth. They laid him flat on his
back, held in the corner's of the mouthpiece, and opened
the bypass of his apparatus, when he revived in a few
seconds, and endeavoured to sit up. After resting
deceased appeared to be all right, and they decided to
move on. The instant he got on his legs he collapsed
again, sank on the floor, and became unconscious. They
again held the corners of his mouth, and opened his
bypass, but it appeared to have no effect, although he
was perceptibly breathing. The body was ultimately
brought out at 12.10 p.m. on the following day. The
apparatus was taken off and carefully examined, and
was found to be in good order, and a doctor who was in
attendance at the mine examined the body superficially,
and concluded that deceased had been dead for many
hours. He examined it again when brought to bank,
and stated in evidence at the inquest that1 in his opinion
the primary cause of death was inhalation of foul air,
but whether the secondary cause was dilatation of the
heart or further inhalation of foul air it was impossible
to say. From examination of the man’s blood, he had
concluded that there was no evidence of CO poisoning,
that the body was free from the pink discoloration indi-
cative of this, but the ears were dark purple, in his
opinion indicating CO2 poisoning. Dr. Haldane was
good enough subsequently to examine a sample of the
blood which had been kept in a hermetically sealed tube,
and was satisfied that it did not indicate any trace of
CO. Analysis of a sample of the atmosphere taken at
the scene of the accident showed that it consisted of
almost pure CH4 and very little oxygen. Dr. Haldane
was of opinion that unless the man died from the burst-
ing of an aneurism or something internal, which might
have been revealed by a post-mortem examination
(which unfortunately was not made), the man must have
been brought down solely by the deficiency of oxygen,
and that this view appeared to be supported by his rapid
revival after the first collapse. A few inhalations of the
foul air would not have been likely to affect him very
seriously, as he had his mouthpiece in all the time, and
therefore the foul air would be largely diluted by the
oxygen unless the valve was shut, which Mr. Cadman
assured Mr. Johnstone was not the case. Dr. Haldane

was on the whole inclined to the opinion that there
must have been something wrong with the man inter-
nally.

One or two incidents in connection with the rescue
operations are both interesting and instructive. The
third team had just reached the face when it was found
that the pressure of the oxygen in the apparatus of one
of the men was running down too rapidly. On close
inspection, a leak was discovered at the bottom union
of the pipe conveying the oxygen from the reducing
valve to the breathing bag. It was impossible to rectify
this on the spot, and the team at once came out, when
it was found that the leak was due to a defective washer.
When the fifth team was bringing the body out through
a hole in an old fire stopping, one of the men collapsed
and became unconscious, when it was found that his
oxygen valve had by some means become closed, possibly
by the handle having been rubbed against the roof or
side when crawling through the confined space. On
opening the valve he immediately revived, and continued
at work for about 15 minutes, when, as he felt unwell,
he was brought out. When relieved of his apparatus,
on getting outside of the poisonous atmosphere, he
collapsed entirely, and had to be carried to the shaft
bottom on a stretcher. It was perhaps somewhat
imprudent to attempt such an operation without having
a fully-equipped relief team in attendance at the base
of operations, and ready to close up their apparatus and
enter the fouled area at once if called upon to render
assistance; but, apart from this, the whole operations
appeared to have been carried on with care and caution,
and Mr. Cadman and the teams which supported him
appeared to have shown great intelligence and pluck in
persisting in accomplishing the recovery of the body
under very trying conditions. The whole circumstances
appear to emphasise the necessity for the greatest pos-
sible care and forethought in organising and carrying
out such operations, and the very serious danger
involved in such operations if carried on by a limited
number of men at any considerable distance from their
base.

Eighteen fatal and 98 non-fatal accidents on the sur-
face were reported during the year, resulting in 18
deaths and injuries to 99 persons. The corresponding
figures for the preceding year were 18 fatal and 94 non-
fatal accidents, resulting in 18 deaths and injuries to
94 persons. Several of them should not have happened.

During the year 171 dangerous occurrences were
reported. Of these, five were ignitions of firedamp by
naked lights; 122 were underground fires; 27 were
breakages of winding ropes, chains, or other gear; nine
were overwindings; and six were inrushes of water; one
was the wedging of a cage in a shaft, pulling out some
of the walling and temporarily blocking the shaft; and
one was the discovery of 18 lucifer matches among some
loose dirt in a pack in a fiery and dusty mine.

Of the 122 underground fires, 118 were due to spon-
taneous combustion. Of these, one occurred in South
Derbyshire, one in Leicestershire, one in Shropshire,
six in North Staffordshire, 101 in South Staffordshire,
five in Warwickshire, and three in Worcestershire; 101
of them took place in thick coal. The four fires due to
causes other than spontaneous combustion were very
slight, although all of them occurred in fiery and dusty
mines. One of them was due to some dust which had
accumulated on the return pulley of a main and tail rope
haulage becoming incandescent owing to the heating
of the pulley, and on being swept off it fell in sparks.
Another due to the flange of a haulage drum rubbing on a
girder which had been slightly displaced by a movement
of the strata, and emitting sparks which ignited some
waste. A third was due to the friction of an endless
haulage rope on a cast iron roller frame, causing the
sleeper to smoulder; and a fourth was the partial burn-
ing of an empty tub which apparently had been used
for the removal of ashes from the boilers above ground,
and had been sent into the mine smouldering. One of
the gob fires which occurred in a highly inclined work-
ing in North Staffordshire was successfully dammed off
by men wearing self-contained breathing apparatus.

Of the breakages of winding ropes and other gear,
nine were due to the breakage of the ropes or chains in
shafts; two were due to the rope being drawn out of the
cap, in one case the ascending cage having been caught
at the top of the inset and the rope drawn through a
riveted cap; and in the other case, the rings of the rope
cap being caught on the edge of the opening in the
bonnet or cover on the shaft top while the cage was
descending, the whole of the rings being stripped off,
liberating the cage, which fell to the shaft bottom.
Five were due to the breakage of ropes or chains on
underground inclines. Four were due to the cage
slipper getting off and fracturing the guide rods. One
was due to the breaking of a King’s detaching hook.
One was due to some steel girders falling from a cage
in the shaft, and damaging the cage and guide rods,
and five were due to the breakage of different parts of
winding engines. Two of the over windings were due
to the engineman inadvertently starting the engine in
the wrong direction, and would have been prevented
had automatic contrivances to prevent overwinding
been installed. One was due to the keps not having
been withdrawn from under an empty cage at pit bank.
The loaded cage was lifted a few feet from pit bottom,
when the winder, observing that the empty cage was
still on the keps, stopped, and reversed the engine. This,
assisted by the weight of the loaded cage and rope,
caused the cage at pit bank to be raised suddenly. An
Ormerod’s detaching hook which was in use liberated
the rope, but failed to grip the detaching collar, and the
cage fell to the shaft bottom.

Another, attended by very peculiar circumstances,
occurred at Florence Colliery, North Staffordshire, on
February 15. The shaft is 890 yds. in depth, the main
inset being at 860 yds., but winding is also carried on
from an inset at the Bassey Mine ironstone at a depth
of 330 yds. The cages were fitted with Ormerod detach-

ing hooks, and a Whitmore automatic overwind pre-
venter with steam brake was installed. An empty cage
had been sent up from shaft bottom to the Bassey Mine
inset, where it was loaded with tubs of stone and
signalled away. The engineman unfortunately forgot
that the cage was not starting from the main inset, and
putting on full steam, permitted the engine to run as
if for the full depth of the shaft. Owing to the short-
ness of the run, the maximum speed controller of the
Whitmore apparatus did not come into operation, but
the apparatus came into action by cutting off steam and
applying the brake when the cage was about one and
a-half revolutions from the landing plates. The
momentum proved, however, to be too much for the
brakes, with,the result that the cages were overwound.
The ascending cage went into the headgear, the rope
was released from the detaching hook, and went over
the pulley, and the loaded cage with the detaching hook
fell to the shaft bottom. The descending cage had
meantime fallen into the sump, striking the loading
weights attached to the guide rods and breaking some
of the guide rods. A careful examination of the detach-
ing collar appeared to show that the detaching hook had
not passed through it. The upper flange of the collar
had been thickly coated with grease off the winding
rope, and this grease had not been marked by the wings
of the detaching hook. Neither the rope cap nor the
“ D ” link which connected it to the detaching hook
had been damaged, and the pin of the “ D ” link
remained in position. The detaching hook was subse-
quently recovered from the sump, and was found to have
been very little damaged. The top lugs had not been
shorn, twisted, or torn open. The copper rivet had
been shorn through, and the set pins at bottom showed
evidence of slight shearing, indicating that the hook had
opened, although when recovered in the shaft bottom it
was found to have closed again, and the pin of the
bottom “ D ” link was in its normal position, but had
been broken close to the jaw of the link on the nut side.
The only feasible explanation of the failure of the hook
which has been suggested is that, before it had reached
the detaching collar, the descending cage had struck
the stretching weights in the sump, that by some means
the balance rope which connected the bottoms of the
two cages had become jammed or arrested, and thus
caused a very violent jerk to be transmitted through the
balance rope to the bottom of the ascending cage, result-
ing in the springing open of the hook. In both this
and the last-mentioned case the makers of the hooks
were consulted, and reported that the hooks had appa-
rently been in working order. They were unable to
suggest any explanation of the failures.

Prosecutions.—Proceedings against a mine owner and
manager were instituted by the Home Office for 18 con-
traventions of the Electrical Regulations. Convictions
against the owner were obtained on ^11 the charges, and
fines amounting to £105, with .£10 10s. costs, were
imposed. The magistrates dismissed the charges
against the manager. Another mine owner was prose-
cuted for three contraventions of the Electrical
Regulations. One of the charges was dismissed.
Another was dismissed on payment of costs, and on
the third charge a conviction was obtained and a fine
of £2 imposed, with £2 4s. costs. Similar charges were
made against the manager of the mine, but were dis-
missed. One hundred and nineteen prosecutions by
owners against employees for contraventions of the Coal
Mines Act, 1911, and of the General Regulations and
Special Rules, and of the Cruelty to Animals Acts, were
reported. In 113 of these convictions were obtained,
three w’ere withdrawn on payment of costs, and three
were dismissed without costs. In several cases the
agents appearing for the owners stated in court that the
case was only brought before the magistrates under
pressure from the inspector. Such action is subversive
to proper discipline, as it tends to create an impression
in the minds of the employees that the owners and
managers are less interested in enforcing the provisions
of the Act and Regulations than the inspector.

Coal Mines Act, 1911. — Generally speaking, com-
mendable efforts have been made by the colliery owners
and managers to comply with the provisions of the new
Act and Regulations, and in the great majority of cases
the alterations to existing plant and the provision of new
plant necessitated by the Act and Regulations have been
provided. In some cases, however, notably with regard
to the provision of means for reversing the air current
required by section 31 (3), the provision of detaching
hooks and automatic contrivances to prevent overwind-
ing required by section 40 (2), and the provision of
clear spaces between sets of tubs or between the tubs
and the side of the road nearest to them required by
section 43 (3), delay has occurred, owing, in the first
two cases, to the makers of the apparatus having so
many orders in hand that it was impossible for the mine
owners to obtain delivery of the plant within the con-
tract time, and in the last-mentioned case, owing to the
difficulty in carrying out the work with the limited
number of men permitted under certain conditions by
the Explosives in Coal Mines Order.

There were 830 candidates for firemen’s certificates,
and of these 274 failed.

The provisions as to searching workmen for matches
and other prohibited articles before each commence-
ment of work (section 35 (2)) are now being more fully
complied with.

During the year 364 samples of mine air were taken
for analysis, the results of which indicate that the stan-
dard of ventilation is being fairly well maintained.

The new requirements with regard to surveyors have
now been almost universally complied with, although
very considerable difficulty has been experienced in
getting the owners of some very small mines to under-
stand that the , requirements applied to such mines.
During the year’ 39 first-class managers’ certificates
were endorsed, and 15 certificates to existing surveyors
w’ere issued.