July 24, 1914.

Supplement to THE COLLIERY GUARDIAN.

increased very largely since last year. Whereas during
1912 there were 110 machines driven by electricity and
394 by compressed air, during 1913 the number had
risen to 134 and 531 respectively, an increase of 161
machines. The output of mineral from these machines
was 3,545,249 tons as compared with 2,670,679 tons in
the previous year. The number of mines using
machines was 89, the same as in the year 1912. The
number of conveyors at the coal face increased by one
only, from 57 to 58.

Below are particulars of the coal-cutting machines in
use

Number driven by Statute tons cut by

Description.	Elec- tricity.	Com- pressed air.	Elec- tricity.	Com- pressed air.
Disc 		... 56 ..	.	68 ...	649,202 ..	581,835
Bar 	.....	... 31 ..	.	15 ..	. 361,316 ..	152,285
Chain 		... 44 ..	9	. 288,278 ..	45,297
Percussive		...	3 ..	. 436 7.	1,682 ..	. 1,464,647*
Rotary heading...	... — ..	3 ..	—	707
Total		... 134 ..	. 531 ..	.1,300,478 ..	.. 2,244,771*

* Including 6,464 tons of fireclay.

Accidents.—During the year notice was received by
the inspector of 1,110 accidents. Of these 207 were
fatal accidents causing the death of 211 persons, as com-
pared with 212 accidents and 214 deaths during the
preceding year. The non-fatal accidents which caused
injury to 968 persons numbered 903, as compared with
856 persons injured by 814 accidents in 1912.

The following is a summary of fatal and non-fatal
accidents, classified according to place and cause :—

Place and cause.

Explosions of firedamp
or coaldust...........

Falls in mines .......

Shaft accidents.......

Miscellaneous under-
ground ...............

Non-fatal All non-fatal

Fatal	accidents	accidents

acci-	reported	disabling for

dents.	to	more than

inspector.* 7 days.

02	02	0Q

<D d		p, (D	rtf CD		o d
cSTS	02		d d		s.a
ft £  <x> 58	rd	g ft S <X> 58	02 d  5	o ft 2 a	o 02  <D
02	p	02	Pm	02	Pm
—	—	.. 14.	.. 19..	11 .	14
1017	; io3’	.. 316.,	..331..	.14,254 .	.14,339
10..	. 10.	.. 26..	.. 51..	. 286..	.	316

59... 60... 417...435...28,734...28,790

Total underground... 170... 173... 773...836...43,285...43,459

On surface ................ 37...	38... 130...132... 2,985 .. 2,992

Gross total in 1913 ... 207... 211... 903...968...46,270 . 46,451

Total in 1912 ............ 212...	214 . 814...856 38,944...39,045

* and t footnotes on page iii.

The death-rates from accidents per 1,000 persons
employed during the year were (a) below ground 0 87,
(5) above ground 0 78, and (c) below and above ground
0 85. The figures for the preceding year were (a) 0 88,
(5) 0’95, and (c) 0’89. Although there is no marked
difference between the figures for the two years, yet the
balance is upon the right side.

It is gratifying to be able to record that during the
year there were nd fatalities due to explosions of fire-
damp or coal dust—a result attributable doubtless to
the fact that where ignitions of gas did take place the
mines were either wet or quite free from coal dust.
Fourteen non-fatal accidents occurred in naked-light
pits, causing injury to 19 persons. In nearly all the
cases reported, greater care should have been exercised
by the deputy making the inspection. When making
inspections the inspectors of mines frequently find that
in spite of the possession of a qualifying certificate
obtained by examination, the deputy in charge of a
district is either incapable of finding, or unwilling to
find, gas when the percentage is less than 2|. This
matter has been taken up with the managers of mines,
who in every case have given the assurance that definite
instructions have been given to the officials that any gas
whatever showing upon the flame of the safety lamp
must be reported.

Of the total deaths due to accidents which occurred
underground during the year, 59 per cent, are
attributable to falls of roof and side. In 1912 the per-
centage was not more than 48, so that there is a distinct
falling off under this heading. It is a lamentable fact
that many of these accidents are avoidable, and are the
result of carelessness, indifference, or want of thought.
On November 27 two brothers were at work on a long-
wall face at Greenside Colliery, Durham, in a seam
3 ft. 3 in. section with a grey metal roof. The top canch
had been shot during the previous night up to the coal
face, and the shot had probably spread sideways over
the gate side cutting props. The place was inspected
20 minutes before the accident, when one of the hewers
was kirving on the right side near the gate end. The
men fired a very fast shot, which knocked out the three
gate side cutting props and a prop in front of the pack
wall. The brother told deceased to reset the timber
before going under the side of the canch, but he dis-
regarded the warning and was crushed underneath a
fall of roof. It appears that the brothers had quarrelled
with theii’ marrows and refused to share wages. They
had fired a fast shot with very little kirving, as it was
the end of the shift, and deceased, in his hurry to fill
the coal out, neglected to reset the timber. This
accident also emphasises the danger of taking the canch
up to the coal face. It is a very common practice, and
is done for the convenience of the hewers when filling
tubs at the gate end. In this case a double row of gate
side cutting props had been set to prevent the shot in
the canch spreading sideways over the coal roof. The
back row of props was withdrawn to enable the hewer
to work, but cases are often noticed where the hewer
has knocked additional props out for his convenience.
As this is done under a roof which has been drawn to
some extent by shot-firing, it is a common source of
accident.

There were 10 fatal shaft accidents involving the loss
of as many lives in connection with shafts. At Wallsend
Colliery, Northumberland, seven persons were ascending
the upcast shaft, and amongst them a driver boy who
sat at the end of the cage. As the cage neared the
surface this boy probably attempted to rise preparatory
to getting out. As the cage lifted the doors which close
the shaft top, the rush of air caused him to lose his
balance and he fell. Fence gates were provided, but
when not in use they slide upon bearers at the top of
the cage. On this occasion the onsetter had failed to
place the gates in position. The shaft top has since
been improved by the addition of an air lock which,
when the outer doors are closed, takes away the pressure
from the doors at the shaft top.

There were 59 accidents from miscellaneous causes
underground resulting in the death of 60 persons. Six
of these were by explosives, 44 in connection with
haulage operations, and nine from various causes which
are difficult to classify. The fatal accidents by
explosives have increased by one, but the number of
deaths is the same as in the previous year. Out of the
six fatal accidents which occurred five of them could
easily have been avoided. Of the fatal accidents, five
were due to gunpowder, and of the 100 persons injured
by explosives, 77 received injuries due to the use of
gunpowder.

It is observed that 23 out of 90 non-fatal accidents
were due to persons not having taken sufficient shelter,
and 17 happened while conveying or handling explosives,
in addition to 13 due to the use of naked lights. All
of these could have been prevented by the exercise of
ordinary care. Inspectors are continually drawing
attention to the careless way in which explosives,
particularly in naked-light pits, are handled by the
workpeople. Forty-four persons lost their lives, and
250 were seriously injured upon underground haulage
roads. Of these, 28 were killed and 166 injured while
actually engaged in haulage operations, and five persons
were killed and 19 injured while walking either to or
from their work. Twenty of the fatal accidents occurred
in connection with horse haulage, and of these, 11 were
due to the drivers falling off the limbers. Two persons
were killed and six injured while illegally riding, and
three persons injured by going in front instead of behind
tubs while moving them by hand on inclined roads.

There were no fatalities from electricity and only six
non-fatal accidents due to electricity, as compared with
three fatal and two non-fatal accidents in 1912. Con-
sidering that the use of electricity underground has
increased during the year from 64,583 to 79,422 horse-
power, this result cannot be called unsatisfactory.

There is a reduction of seven deaths as the result of
fatal accidents on the surface, the figures being 37 fatal
accidents and 38 deaths in 1913, and 45 accidents and
45 deaths in 1912. Five of the accidents were connected
with machinery, 20 occurred on railways or tramways
and 12, involving the deaths of 13 persons, were due to
miscellaneous causes.

Forty-seven notices under the heading of “ Dangerous
Occurrences ” were received during the year, and were
classified as follows :—Ignition of gas or coal dust, 8 ;
underground fires, 6 ; breakage of winding ropes, chains
or other gear by which persons are raised or lowered,
28; overwinding while persons were being raised or
lowered, 2; inrushes of water, 3. Of the eight ignitions
of gas, six occurred in naked-light pits, and were due to
a candle being raised into a cavity in the roof containing
a small accumulation of firedamp, or to a slight feeder
at the face of the working. Two were caused by shots
firing small feeders. Five of the six underground fires
fortunately caused practically no damage, but there were
possibilities of considerable danger in most of them. On
Sunday, January 12, a fire occurred in the Bothal shaft
sidings in the Main Coal seam at Ashington Colliery,
Northumberland, which resulted in the loss of 83 ponies
in the Yard seam stables situated 400 yards inbye.
Incandescent lamps, in parallel at 100 volts, were
installed in the pit bottom, and the cables were enclosed
in wood casing. These lamps were not switched off
when the men left the mine at one o’clock, and were
still burning when the descent was made at eight o’clock
at night. They did not fail for some time afterwards.
The power system was three-phase, 500 volts pressure.
The Bothal switch in the power-house controlled the
underground system, and also the surface system
embracing the brickworks and compressor plant. The
brickworks distribution board was near the power
station, and the surface system had been connected
temporarily to the underground system about one
month before. This did not comply with Electricity
Rule 11 (1912) or with Section 1 (9) of the 1905 rules.
Between three and four o’clock on Sunday afternoon
two leakages were recorded in the power house at an
interval of half an hour. They were momentary and
were not located. On starting up a surface compressor
motor at five o’clock, a fuse was blown on the distribution
board at the brickworks, a short circuit occurred at the
heapstead distribution board, and a heavy earth blew
the neutral fuse in the power house. The switches were
cut out at the brickworks but the leakage indicator
still showed an earth on the system, which was only
removed when the Bothal switch was drawn. It was
thought that a bad contact in the compressor motor
switch had upset the phase balance producing an
abnormal current and blowing the fuses. The electrical
staff proceeded to repair the heapstead distribution
board. Had the separate switches for cutting off the
supply of current to the mine been in use, the under-
ground cables would have been dead, as power was not
required and a surface fault could have been readily
located. At 7.45 p.m. the fan attendant observed
smoke ascending the upcast shaft. On descending for
investigation it was found that the fire centred round
the haulage motor-room near the pit bottom, and that
from its dimensions it must have been burning for a
considerable time. The room was brick lined and

contained a haulage motor and the distributing switch
board for the mine. One end of the room had contained
a steam haulage plant, and this part had a wooden floor.
There were 115 ponies in the stables; the live ponies
were found alternately with the dead ones, and usually
the older ponies survived. The fire was got under
control on one side after it had destroyed an air
crossing which allowed the fire to be attacked
from the inbye end. On the other road the
separation doors on the in bye side of the fire were
opened by a man equipped with a smoke helmet. This
increased the volume of air, which was carried back
from a second intake airway for a distance of about
100 yds. by canvas and timber brattice to the site of
the fire. The water supply was plentiful, and the fire
was under control within 24 hours. The fire may have
been caused in one of three ways:—(1) by a burning
snuff from a lamp belonging to one of the men who left
the mine at one o’clock; (2) by spontaneous ignition of
inflammable material in the unused part of the motor-
room ; (3) by the lighting cables which were enclosed in
wood casing. As both lighting and power cables were
live, the fire most probably had an electrical origin. An
underground fire occurred on October 28, 1913, at the
Ouston E pit, which might easily have had serious
consequences. The fire was the result of an explosion
in an air-compressor cylinder. The exhaust valve
had broken, and the air was churned in the cylinder.
The lubricating oil carbonised, and an explosive mixture
was formed and fired by heat due to compression. The
flame shot out of the back piston rod, which was also
the air-inlet, and passed through a hole in the engine-
house wall to some wood beams supporting the roof of
the connection way from the engine-house to the return
airway only a few feet away. The flash point of the
lubricating oil was 395 degs. Fahr, enclosed and
400 degs. Fahr. open. The Ingersoll compressor had
14-in. cylinders, and the piston made 158 double strokes
per minute. Air was compressed up to 60 lb. per square
inch, and the output was 600 cu. ft. per minute.
They were driven by a 90-horse power electric motor.
The attendant had examined the sight-feed lubricator
only a quarter-of-an-hour before the occurrence. He
said it was in good working order, and the feed was
about two drops per minute. The cylinders were water-
jacketed, and a test afterwards showed that the quantity
of water circulating per minute was 18 gals. The
temperature of inlet water was 62 degs., and outlet
water 66 degs.

There were three failures of winding ropes during
coal-drawing operations. One occurred at Ryhope
Colliery, Durham, where a flat wire rope, 4| in. wide
and 1 in. thick, with an estimated breaking strain of
100 tons, broke with a load of 6 tons 15 cwt., soon after
the full cage was raised from the shaft bottom. The
rope had been in use 14 months in a hot wet upcast
furnace shaft, where all the conditions were un-
favourable. At Ellington Colliery, Northumberland, a
round rope, 1| in. diameter, calculated to have a
breaking strain of 54 tons, broke about three feet above
the capel when the full cage was just above the keps at
the surface. The load upon the rope at that point
would be some 5 tons 8 cwt. The rope had only been
in use for 12 months, where the winds average some
40 per hour for 15 hours ; and as the wires appeared to
be hard and brittle, the cause of the breakage could
hardly be put down to excessive wear. On September 13
a serious shaft accident at Easington Colliery, Durham,
which caused considerable damage to the winding
engine-house, engines, and shaft ropes. A new winding
rope had been put on a few days before the accident,
and had stretched somewhat ; it was during the
shortening operations that the accident—an overwind—
occurred. The speed at which the cage descended
caused the overwind apparatus to came into operation
and shut off steam and apply the brakes. The
brakes failed to check the cage and, owing to
the overwind apparatus having put the gear out of
operation, the engineman had no control over the
engines. The chains on the ascending rope were
detached and held in the bell, and the rope and cap
crashed through the engine - house roof, practically
demolishing it and damaging the engines. The post
brakes were pulled out of their place, and the steam
range broken. The winding engines had 40 in. cylinders,
with 6 ft. stroke. The parallel drum was 20 ft. diameter.
The steam pressure was 100 to 120 lb. per square
inch. The brakes were of the post type; metal block
upon elm cieating on the drum. Several important
points arise out of this accident. The question one
naturally asks is, Why did the brakes fail if they were
applied immediately? In the opinion of some witnesses
of the accident, however, who judged by the rapidity
with which the cage descended, steam must have been
applied. In this case it can be easily imagined that
unless the engines were rapidly reversed and steam
applied, the momentum of the cage would very soon be
too great for the brakes. The fact that there were two
enginemen in the engine-house at the time may account
for some aberration on the part of the winder. It may
be that if the overwinding apparatus had been discon-
nected before the operations in the shaft had been
commenced, the overwind might have been prevented.
The accident will certainly draw attention to the danger
attached to similar operations, especially where there
are unbalanced weights in the shafts. During the early
morning on November 16, some stone was being drawn
at Bowden Close Colliery, Durham. Just before one
run the engineman left his handles, and on returning
forgot to reverse the engine. In consequence, the cage
at bank was drawn up, but was stopped by the over-
winder when the capel was ju<t through the detaching
bell. The overwinder being reset, the cage was being
lowered, when, owing to the rope running close to the
side of the bell (the shaft being not quite plumb), the
bottom ring of the capel caught the lip of the bell and
was pulled off the socket, carrying the other four rings