Miy 1, 1914.

THE COLLIERY GUARDIAN.

953

lamp which hung at the corner of the turning off the
main west level into the lamp station was found in a
shattered condition some little distance outbye. It is
contrary to experience to find indications of the develop-
ment of great force at the originating point of colliery
explosions. The position in which the lamp-cabin doors
and the red lamp were found would be compatible with
a projection of force from inbye. Curiously enough
an underground lamp was found lying on the table of
the lamp cabin with unburnt paper inside it.

Indication of force, taken by itself, is sometimes an
uncertain guide to the location of the originating point
of a colliery explosion, as often the indications are
conflicting. In some instances (e.g., the Hulton Colliery
explosion, 1910), where there was little or no contradic-
tion in this respect, the case is, of course, quite different.
At Senghenydd the evidence was conflicting, nor was
there general agreement in every instance as to the
interpretation to be put upon the evidence.

After describing the evidences of force as observed
by him, Mr. Redmayne, dealing with the theories put
forward by the representatives of the miners, says he
was much impressed by the evidence of the timberman
Edwards, who said he had never seen a rope running in
the timbers at or near the places named by Messrs.
Winstone and Barker, and that there was plenty of

by the grinding of pieces of rock against other, or by a
prop supporting signalling wires falling and rubbing
the wires together.” If the explosion originated at the
spot mentioned, it is necessary to account for the
indications of force gradually dying out beyond to drum
and in the direction of “ Aberystwyth.” Like Dr.
Atkinson, Mr. Redmayne thinks that this is due to the
fact that the dust got stonier towards the faces.

In connection with the possibility of a spark from the
signalling wires having originated the explosion, there
was a conflict of opinion as to whether a spark from
nine cells of the Dania type, in conjunction with a bell
such as was in use at Senghenydd, would ignite an
explosive mixture of firedamp and air. Some experi-
ments were carried out with the idea of determining
this point in the rescue station at New Tredegar on
January 1, and some further experiments on January 29.
Briefly, the result was as follows:—An ignition was
produced with a pressure of 13J volts (from nine Dania
cells) applied to a bell taken from Senghenydd Colliery,
the ignition being produced by rubbing a knife edge
along two signal wires mounted to represent the wires
in the mine. No ignition was produced when a pressure
below 13J volts was applied to a Senghenydd bell. But
the experiments were not exhaustive in the opinion of
Mr. Nelson, who conducted them, with the assistance of

place further outbye in the Mafeking return in October
1910—namely, by heavy falls liberating a large volume
of gas. These heavy falls exposed seams of coal and
beds of hard rock, and an outburst of gas may have
come away at one of them. The only apparent means
of ignition would be sparks from the electric signalling
apparatus, or from rocks brought down from the fall, and
we know that explosions have been originated by both
these causes.

Undoubtedly electrical signalling was being used in
a part of the mine in which there was likely to be
inflammable gas in quantity sufficient to be indicative
of danger. It was argued by counsel appearing on
behalf of the owners and management, and evidence was
called to show that the sparks caused by bringing the
wires together, or in the ringing of the bells, were not
of sufficient intensity- to ignite gas—in effect that there
was no “ open sparking.” In this connection he can
only regret that the safer plan of excluding sparks
altogether was not adopted. It is all the more astonish-
ing that the management should have faced the risk
that the sparks produced might have ignited gas in view
of the Bedwas Colliery explosion, which occurred on
March 27, 1912, and which was proved beyond reasonable
doubt to have been caused by the sparks from an electric
bell.

Fig. 8.



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Fig. 9.—Sketch Plan of Workings in East Mafeking District.

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clearance. He thinks, too, had there actually been
smouldering wood at this spot, long before a fire
originated its presence would have been detected by the
smell. Nor does he consider it at all likely that gas
would exist in a cavity in a road in which a current of
152,000 cubic feet of air was passing per minute, though
it is not impossible. As to sparks produced by falling
stones providing a possible means of ignition, he is
not prepared to rule this out, but wherever the explo-
sion originated he cannot accept the theory that it
proceeded in an inbye direction from the neighbourhood
of the No. 1 north road end.

Dr. Atkinson required for his theory an outburst of
gas on the road itself. As a matter of fact, there was
a very heavy fall, but whether it took place before or
after the explosion it is difficult to say. Fig. 8 is a
levelling of the fall undertaken by Mr. Greenland Davies
and the colliery surveyor. It would almost appear that
the greater part of the debris fell prior to the explosion,
owing to the discoloration of the greater part of the
sides. The arrangement of the signal wires and the
position of the “ journeys ” on the Mafeking incline as
found when this part of the mine was first explored is
indicated on fig. 7. Mr. Dyer Lewis thought that
“ a probable initiation of the explosion may have been
a fall of roof where re-opening was going on and where
bashing chains are visible—some short distance below
the brow of the incline,” that “ the fall of roof was
followed by gas from the upper seams which was ignited



the rescue station engineer, in the presence of repre-
sentatives of the owners and the Miners’ Federation.
As to the possibility of sparks igniting gas, there is the
evidence of Mr. Shaw t? the effect that he had frequently
seen sparks from falls of ground, and the incident which
happened at the Lletty Shenkin Colliery, Cwmbach, on
January 27 last points to the possibility of an explo-
sion of firedamp being caused by sparks other than
electrical.

The boy Hill said that the sound of the explosion
proceeded from Mafeking, and a collier, Thomas Jones
(working in the Nine-feet seam, below the Four-feet
seam and at a spot between 80 and 90 yards from the
storage), said that he heard a roar, a bang and a roar.
This variation might be due to a fall or to a recrudescence
of force. Such a recrudescence would be likely to occur
in the storage. Were it not for the contrary evidence
of force on the Mafeking storage, Mr. Redmayne says
he would have little difficulty in coming to the definite
conclusion that the explosion originated at the point
suggested by Dr. Atkinson. As it is, the weight of
evidence is in favour of his theory.

Conclusions and Recommendations.

Probable Site of Origin and Possible Cause of
Explosion.—The Chief Inspector comes to the conclusion
that there is strong probability of the explosion having
originated on the Mafeking incline, and that it was
preceded by an occurrence similar to that which took

Rescue Operations.—The position of the bodies points
to the persons who were working at the face having
come out only a comparatively short distance from the
face. They were, in all probability, overcome by the
afterdamp resulting from the explosion, and not by the
fumes generated by the fire, and did not survive long
enough for the fumes from the fire to affect them. The
persons engaged at work on the haulage roads were
killed outright. Mr. Redmayne very much doubts
whether it would have been possible to have saved any
of the persons in the Pretoria, Mafeking, Kimberley and
Ladysmith districts, but he inclines to the belief that if
rescue apparatus had been kept at the colliery, and men
equipped with breathing apparatus, and carrying with
them a lighter form of apparatus, had at once penetrated
the West York by the return and the Bottanic district,
a few more lives might have been saved. Much valuable
time was lost, as is so often the case, immediately after
the explosion, but it must be remembered that Mr. Shaw
had lost a great number of his officials. He was short
handed, and he and those who accompanied him in the
first descent of the mine certainly did all that was
humanly possible with the means at their disposal to
combat the fires, but Mr. Redmayne is convinced that
had there been available at that time an adequate water
supply, and had brigades of rescuers attacked the three
fires (i.e., at the two crosscuts and that on the main
west level) simultaneously, the fires might have been
extinguished in a comparatively short time. In view of
the fact that the colliery was such a gassy one, and as it
had already been devastated by an explosion, the
management should have made arrangements for a
supply of water adequate to meet an emergency of the
kind that actually occurred.

Arrangements should be made—they need only be of
a very simple nature—whereby on the occurrence of an
explosion or fire, an agreed-upon signal should be given
at the earliest possible moment, e.g., by blowing the
colliery whistle (“ horn,” “ hooter,” or “ buzzer ”) a
certain number of times, and that on the sounding of
this signal rescue hands should at once assemble, secure
the necessary apparatus, and proceed upon their allotted
tasks, just as firedrill is carried out on board ship. For
this purpose collieries might be formed into groups and
practices be carried out at different collieries of a group
from time to time.

The Chief Inspector has considered the question as to
whether the reversal of the air-current, if carried out
immediately after the occurrence of the disaster, would
have resulted in the saving of life. He thinks it would
not, for reasons which are already given. The mine
was so laid out that the reversal of the air-current
would have resulted in driving the afterdamp back onto
the faces, in some districts, e.g., Mafeking, if the
explosion had originated on the return of the Mafeking
district. Had this colliery been provided with a double
main intake the task of dealing with the fire on the main
west level would have been a comparatively simple
matter, as it could have been stopped off at both ends
and so isolated, always assuming that there was not a
fire in both intakes.

The State of the Mine Prior to the Explosion.—The
conditions were such as might be expected to exist in a
fiery colliery, and the Chief Inspector is not prepared to
state that the ventilation was inadequate under normal
conditions of the mine. In respect of the presence of