950

THE COLLIERY GUARDIAN

May 1, 1914.

tricts was carried out in the return airways. Only the
main haulage from the Kimberley and Ladysmith
districts was entirely in the intake air.

The management of the Senghenydd Colliery were
gradually carrying the requirement of section 62 (2)
into effect, and before the Act came into force
had already ordered a few hundred trams closed at
each end.

The main haulage is in nearly all parts of the mine
carried out by means of engines actuated by compressed
air. The rate of haulage was from four to eight miles
an hour, and usually 24 trams constituted a “ journey ”
or train.

An electrical system of signalling was in use, and a
good deal of attention was drawn to it in the course of
the enquiry. There were a number of sets of signalling
apparatus in different parts of the colliery—over a
dozen in all—and each set consisted briefly of an
electric bell of the trembler pattern, which, though pro-
tected by a cast iron cover, was not gas-tight, a battery
of anything from six to nine dry cells of the Dania
pattern giving, when new, about 1’5 volts per cell, and
two bare wires, described as No. 8 galvanised steel
wires, supported on insulators, which in turn were
secured to the side timbers. The wires were run 12 in.
or 18 in. apart on the same side of the roadway. The
bells and batteries were, in general, fixed in engine
houses. Electric sparks, which may or may not have
been capable of igniting an explosive mixture of fire-
damp and air (the evidence on this point will be
examined later) were undoubtedly, by the very nature
of the apparatus in use, of frequent occurrence. Every
time the wires separated after having been brought
together, or bridged across by a knife or file for the
purpose of giving short, sharp rings of the bell, a spark
or sparks would be formed at the instant of break, and
every time the bell was rung there would be a rapid
succession of sparks at the make and break contacts
beneath the iron cover.

Ventilation.

Ventilation of the mine was produced by a fan of the
“Indestructible ” Walker type, which was placed at the
surface and was steam-driven. Arrangements for
reversing the air current of the mine in accordance with
the requirements of section 31 (3) of the Coal Mines Act,
1911, had not been quite completed, and the owners and
manager were guilty of a contravention of section 31 (3)
of the Coal Mines Act, 1911.

The book in which the air measurements were entered
was not in the form prescribed by the Secretary of State,
and was not countersigned by the manager and under-
manager. The management had, therefore, contravened
section 24 (1) and (2) of the Coal Mines Act, 1911. The
requirement (c), contained in General Regulation 77,
had not been carried out either in respect of the
east or west side prior to the explosion. Mr.
Redmayne is unable, therefore, to say what was
the volume of air current which traversed the working
faces, and whether or not the leakage of air as
between the commencement of the district and the
face was heavy. Owing, however, to the relative
position of the intake and return airways, he inclines
to the belief that the leakage was not considerable.
It was advanced by the representatives of the owners
and management that as a legal month is a calendar
month, there was no infringement of Act or Regula-
tions, seeing that the explosion happened on October 14
and the calendar month did not expire until the 15th.
On the east side, which resumed work on November 26,
no measurement, however, was made in the district at
points about 100 yards from the first working place
until January 19, 1914.

That the mine generated laige quantities of gas is
evidenced by the analysis of samples of air taken by
the mine inspectors in the return air. The amount of
inflammable gas generated in the mine amounted to
about 1,200 cubic feet per minute. The mine was in
this respect typical of the more fiery mines in the steam
coal area of the South Wales coalfield. The west side
was ventilated by four splits. The air current, passing
round the Kimberley workings, joined a split of fresh
. air coming through Baker’s heading, so that the west
side of the Mafeking district was ventilated partly by
return and partly by intake air. The air in the Mafeking
hard heading would contain the whole of the firedamp
generated in the Kimberley and Mafeking districts, as
well as part of that generated in the Pretoria district.
Mr. Redmayne does not think that the best practice was
adopted in ventilating this portion of the mine, for
though the total quantity of air drawn through the mine
was sufficient if properly distributed, and therefore under
normal conditions, the mine was probably adequately
ventilated, yet seeing that the mine was of a gassy
character, and one liable to outbursts of gas, it would
have been better practice to have carried out a scheme

whereby the Mafeking and Kimberley districts had each
its own separate intake and return, so that each district
would have been in fact a separate ventilating district.

That the mine was in places liable to sudden out-
bursts of gas is evidenced by the fact that in October
1910, on the occurrence of a large fall on the Mafeking
level in the neighbourhood of some faults, there was a
heavy discharge of gas which continued to be delivered
for four days after the fall was cleared. On this occasion
the men were withdrawn from the mine.

The safety lamp used at the mine was the Cambrian,
with lead rivet locking device, and the lamps were
supplied by Messrs. Thomas and Williams. The lamp
had been approved, but the lamps in use were fitted
with unapproved glasses. Lamps were lighted, locked,
and issued to the workmen and officials at the surface,
and were again examined underground at places termed
“locking stations.” These were cabins—one on the
west and the other on the east side—situated a little
distance from the shaft, and just off the main intake
airway. The lamps were examined by the firemen at
this place when meeting the incoming shifts. If anyone
lost his light when at work he had to come outbye to
the lamp cabin to have it relit. This was done by men
known as the lamp-lockers, who, though authorised by
the manager to perform this work, had not been

Fig. 2.—Barograph taken at

C(ML 1-5
[Clod 1-2
(COAL 3 2

' RocA ___

■Clift _

''Fireclay ______________

■ Cleft * layers of P.och
Black Chfr Quar

''Clod ____________

fireclay-----------

Bastard Fireclay
Chft ------—-------

%>od '0
COAL 2
Clod 2
COAL 3
Clod '
COAL III
Wad 12-

3

I 8

I 6

2 6

2 2

2 8

9

Clift with large Al me Balls
_ Rock------------------------

Chft with large Mme Balls
(COAL 1-6'

Fig. 3.—Section of Portion of Lancaster
Pit.

appointed in writing for the purpose. The Chief
Inspector, however, is satisfied that they were competent
to perform the work which devolved upon them ; but
the fact of their not being appointed in writing con-
stitutes a technical breach of section 34 (iii.).

Coaldust.

The screens being about 80 yards from the top of the
downcast shaft, little coaldust was carried down the
shaft from the surface, but some would be blown off the
full tubs ascending the shaft. The open character of
many of the trams, and the fact that in all the trams
the coal was piled high above the top, were fruitful
sources for the formation of coaldust. The mechanical
haulage was at the rate of from 4 to 8 miles an hour,
and sets of trams coming out of the Kimberley, Lady-
smith and a part of the No. 2 South (Pretoria) districts
would be hauled against the air-current. The only parts
of the mechanical haulage roads of the mine which were
naturally wet was a stretch of the main west level (in

the Kimberley district) and a stretch—about 28 yards—
of the Ladysmith intake. It was noticeable, however,
that for a long distance outbye from the wet place in
Ladysmith, fungoid growths on the timber pointed to a
certain amount of dampness. The general character of
the mine was, however, dry and dusty, though not so
dusty as many mines in the South Wales coalfield.

The means adopted for dealing with the dust on the
roads was as follows :—Every afternoon and night men
were engaged in shovelling up the dust from the floor.
It must be understood, however, that the whole length
of these roads was not cleaned every 24 hours. The
roof and sides were not cleaned at all. Efforts had
been made at one time to clean the roof and sides, but
it was stated that it was found impracticable to remove
the dust. Mr. Redmayne is not satisfied that serious
efforts were, in fact, made towards removing the side
and top dust, nor does he consider that its removal was
impracticable. Consequently, the requirements of
section 62 (3) of the Coal Mines Act, 1911, were not
fully observed.

Water from the surface was conveyed down the
shafts by two columns of 2 in. diameter pipes, one
column in each shaft. These were joined to pipes 1J in.
in diameter laid along the main haulage roads, fitted
every 30 to 40 yards with taps to which hose pipes were

the Bute Oefices, Aberdare.

connected, and the floors of the roadway were watered
every night. The roof and sides were not watered; as
if practised it would have so disturbed the roof and
sides as to bring on a “ squeeze ” and cause the roadway
to collapse. Beyond the end of these pipes watering of
the floor was done by means of water carts occasionally
brought in by the haulage. That the watering of the
floors was well done was proved by the damp state of
the mine when inspected early in December, nearly two
months after the explosion. In addition to these efforts
towards laying the dust, means were also taken to
prevent its accumulation by sprinkling the trams with
water. The sprinklers were not placed at the spot
where the mechanical haulage of the trams commenced,
but a considerable distance outbye thereof, and there-
fore these sprinklers would not prevent a great deal of
dust from being formed. From his inspection of the
mine, subsequent to the explosion, Mr. Redmayne had
no doubt whatever that coaldust existed on the roof,
sides and timber in dangerous quantity.

The water supply at the colliery was not great, but
sufficient for general purposes under normal conditions.

Management.

The total number of persons employed underground
in the mine was about 950, there being 440 in the west
side. Mr. Edward Shaw was the agent and manager of
the colliery. Considering the west side alone there
were acting under the under-manager three overmen—
viz., one for the Ladysmith and Kimberley districts,
another for Mafeking, and one for Pretoria. Under
them again were 14 firemen.

The firemen descended the mine at 3.30 a.m., two
hours in advance of the colliers, and, having made the
statutory examination of their districts, came outbye
again to meet their men at the lamp locking station, the
men having descended at 5.30 a.m. At Senghenydd
there was but one meeting station for the whole of the
west side of the mine, and that only 440 yards from the
bottom of the downcast shaft. In the majority of
instances the distance from the meeting station to the
first working place was 1,300 yards or more. Mr.
Redmayne has had the distances travelled by the
firemen, starting from and finishing at the lamp locking
station, measured on the plan, as well as the distance
from the station to the first working place, and thinks
it is doubtful whether the requirements of section 64 (1)
were complied with, in that the inspection of each
district was not begun and completed within two hours
of the men commencing work in the district. Had a
meeting station been provided in each district within
a reasonable distance of the face, the districts would
not have been too large to allow of thorough inspection
before the commencement of work. As it was, in some
cases the firemen were hard pressed to get round their
districts and be at the locking station within the two
hours, and so be in time to meet the incoming men at
the locking station. At the same time, the men appeared
to be honest and intelligent, and when two of them
stated that as the old Special Rule in force at the
colliery allowed two and a-half hours as the period
within which the inspection had to be made, they were
still under this impression. The manager and under-
manager were at fault in not drawing their attention to
the inaccurate manner of entering their reports.

During the enquiry a good deal of attention was
directed to determining whether or not the examinations
for gas made by the firemen were, in fact, thorough
examinations.