February 20, 1914.

THE COLLIERY GUARDIAN.

423

SPONTANEOUS COMBUSTION IN COALMINES.

A Digest of Evidence before the Committee.

(Continued from page 369.)

Mr. J. T. GREENSMITH.

Mr. John Thomas Greensmith, agent and general
manager of the Brodsworth Main Colliery, near Don-
caster, gave evidence on July 31, 1913. On the question
of the withdrawal of men on the occurrence of sponta-
neous heating in mines, witness said that so far as it
concerned that colliery, this had only been necessary in
one instance, and then not from a point of danger, but
for a short time due to the smoke having to pass along
a portion of the faces of the return. To obviate this a
scouring was put across between two gates, and the coal
face got to work again.

Sixty-four Fires in Four Years.

Taking the recurrences into account, he had had
64 fires at Brodsworth. The first fire was in May
1909. In many of the cases there had been prac-
tically nothing from the fire in the way of smoke, and car-
bon monoxide had not shown itself. As they opened up
a fire they got practically no products of combustion
which were injurious. After carefully going through
the list of fires little doubt could exist as to the
advisability of keeping the faces moving as quickly as
possible. Fires Nos. 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 39 and 44,
were a few instances to back up this statement.
Again, looking at the fires on the line of faults, there
was a similarity between the position of the fires which
had taken place where the face had had to stand for
some reason or other. It was possible, given certain
conditions, i.e., a fall to face, and brisk ventilating
current passing through the same or driven into the
gob, to produce a gob fire. The question of withdrawing
the men was one depending entirely upon the circum-
stances in which the heating or fire took place,
and he failed to see that any hard-and-fast
rule could be laid down for attacking the same, it
being altogether a question for the management to
deal with. If analysis of the air leading up to a
fire and away from it were taken daily, the management
were quite aware of the exact conditions. The fires were
never left, but were in charge of a competent person,
and directly anything unforeseen happened in the
ventilating district they would have power to use their
discretion, as in all other matters appertaining to pit
work. So far as their experience went, directly a fire
is opened up, the products given off were not so
offensive. If all the roads in the vicinity of fires were
thoroughly stonedusted, it was far safer for the future
of the mine to keep the faces advancing than to run the
risk of allowing them to stand, with the resultant falls,
to be followed afterwards by fires. The men themselves
working in the stalls could do a great deal to assist the
management by endeavouring to extract timber, for in
practically every case timber had been found.

Witness said they reported to the inspector of the
district all cases where they anticipated fire. If they
had not smell or smoke they should not report it, but
even if they had stink they would report. From the
fact that they had had warm places with a temperature of
115 degs. and no fire, he should be guided by a tempera-:
ture of 115 degs. or above that. It was possible to get
a temperature of 115 degs. without fire. He did not
think there was any standard laid down, so far as colliery
managers were concerned, as to at what stage these fires
should be reported, and each manager formed his own
* opinion as to when he would report and when he would
not report.

Temperatures at Brodsworth.

Witness said that after a rise of temperature they had
a fall directly they opened it out; if it did not go down,
as a rule they could assume there was something in
front, and that they had not driven the scouring far
enough. In this case a scouring was driven into a
suspected area of 8 yards, and a temperature of 115 degs.
was found, and that 115 degs. went down to normal
again—the 115 degs. at the end of the scouring. He would
fix the standard of where there was danger to be appre-
hended of a fire actually in its initial stage at somewhere
about 115 degs. in his own colliery, but it was very
difficult to fix a standard of that kind to be applied to
all mines. His warning temperature was 93 degs. or
thereabouts, and they might get 110 degs. without
getting trouble. Even then it depended on where they
got the 110 degs. On a road side, where they got a
brisk current passing, they might get close to the road
side a temperature of 100 degs., and if they drove inside
perhaps 1 ft. they might get 115 degs. If the tempera-
ture was 100 degs., he would take steps forthwith to
ascertain whether there was heating taking place. The
normal temperature in the Brodsworth mine was 80 degs.,
taken by thermometers in the coal itself. He did not
think there were any mines in his district where the
natural temperature was not 80 degs. and over. At
Brodsworth he bad made tests of the temperature of the
air at various points. The air was cooler half-way down
the shaft, and there was the same cooling going on
until they got to a certain point, say 200 yards in bye ;
then they began to get a rise. The ventilation amounted
to 290,000 ft. The rise of temperature in the mine was
very slow. The temperature of the upcast pit was
recorded at each shaft, and it stood then at 78 degs.
■The temperature of the intake at that time would be
77 degs. not far from the face, and the temperature of
the return a little way from this point would be, perhaps,

79	degs. Witness said they had no apparent difference
on a Saturday night. The temperatures were recorded
daily, and recorded in a book, and the workmen had an
opportunity of seeing those books. In the working
faces the maximum temperature was 81 degs. That
was an extraordinary temperature, and not usual. The
normal temperature of the mine was approximately

80	degrees. The mine was 595 yards deep, as compared

with other mines in the district extending to 950 yards.
In their case the rise of temperature did not work out
to the rule. According to the rule, their temperature
would be 84 degs. Witness said that at the adjoining
Hickleton Colliery he had only heard of one case of fire,
and that one case was a case of the heating of a pack on
the road side. He could only account for the fact by
saying that the formation of the roof and floor was
different. The other conditions were practically the
same. At Brodsworth these fires all round the shaft pillars
were caused by driving a pair of headings and the air
short-circuiting from one heading to the other. At all
those points they had had fires between the intake and
the return, and in several instances in headings on the
road side with connections. They attributed those fires
in the first place to crush, and the quantity of air going
through the breaks being sufficient to set up oxidation
and combustion. There was probably a mistake made
in driving those headings so close together. That, he
thought, could be obviated in future collieries.

Describing next the method of dealing with these
fires, Mr. Greensmith said the first indications were
smell, and they scarcely had any smoke ; they tackled
them at the early stages, and found that the coal had
broken off from the solid, and left breaks in some cases
from 1 in. to 1J in. Those breaks extended on the other
side in some cases 2 ft., but not more than 2 ft. Then
they took the coal off to the fast, and that was the end
of it. Those pillar fires were not serious. They did
withdraw all the men during the time that they were
dealing with them. The fumes were passing, but by
the time they got any distance away they were diluted
by the amount of fresh air that was passing. It would
be possible where those men were working on the faces
to detect in the volume of air passing over the men a
smell of gas in some instances, but the fumes were not
of such a character that they were dangerous to the
men, as the amount of fire at those particular points
was very small. The pillar fires did not flame; they
burned to dull red in the breaks.

Mode of Treatment.

Continuing, witness said that, with the exception of
fires round the shaft pillar, timber had been found in
practically every case. Leaving out the question of
pillar fires, he thought the fires were mainly caused by
falls to the face. There were several causes. In the
first place, there was a fall to the face which blocked up
ventilation for some time, and it was quite possible that
finally behind that fall there had been a pillar of coal
left, and it was also possible that there might be timber
under the fall. Then they got falls from gate to gate.
In others they got them in the middle between the
gates, and, in others, from one gate side partly on the
bank. As to the steps taken for the safety of the men
when dealing with these fires, in the first case, the fire
inspection in the mine was done by an independent staff
of men, apart from the ordinary pitwork; they were
competent men, and it was the duty of those men on
each shift to visit every part of the mine, in addition to
the ordinary deputies. They also superintended all the
pit, and made a report of their finding. When they got
fires there was a staff of trained men, who were looked
after by another official, who was also competent. In
addition to those officials they had one man who took
the whole pit, and gave his attention also to any fire
which might be taking place. Directly they observed
signs of a fire, in addition to the ordinary stonedusting
on the roads the area was thoroughly stonedusted. It
was practically all stonedust within 200 yards of the
area. The whole place was studied by the officials, and
the manager’s attention was drawn to it; a visit was
made to the place, and after careful consideration it was
decided whether or not to put a stopping, according to
the circumstances, and after giving the question of
ventilation consideration as to which side of the fire to
attack it from, no time was lost in attacking the trouble.
In no case had it ever been thought desirable or
practicable to attempt to stop off a fire. From the
point of view of cheapness it would be very much
cheaper and very much less trouble to stop them off,
but they adopted the principle of filling out in preference
to stopping off, because when they were filled out they
knew the end of them. During the last four years since
fires had occurred they had only had one period of
about three months when they had had no heating
whatever in the mine. Witness said they got fires if
the face was standing. In one case they had eight fires
practically in a line. In the first case there was a fault
which caused a stoppage of the face. Where they had
a cutting-off of the face he attributed the fact that fires
occurred to the gob not settling evenly. It might also
be due to inferior coal on the fault sides. If coal was
left it could be due to that, and particularly because
that class of coal near the fault was usually more in the
form of blacklead at Brodsworth ; it crumbled up very
small.

Speaking of the line of fires already referred to,
Mr. Greensmith said in the first place he attributed them
to the fault being there; and secondly, at that time they
put roads through a fault occasionally for the purpose
of .ventilation, and although those roads were stopped
off they were never completely sealed off, and there was
a little air allowed to leak through, which no doubt set up
oxidation. The size of the fault was 10 ft. 6 in., and the face
travelled very slowly during that period. The first two
were certainly separate fires, but whether the next were
fires.starting from the heat given off from the third or,
second, it was impossible to say. The men were not
withdrawn. There was work proceeding at that time
below the fault, and the return air did not pass over the
men. Another group of four fires practically on one
line witness also attributed to faults. A face was
standing during the strike, and there was a fire. The
pack on the right-hand of the gate had been put on
before the strike. It was at right-angles to the fault,
but close to it. The fires were possibly 40 yards back

from the working face. Witness attributed another fire
to a wood chock.

Splitting the Ventilation.

Witness said that if he had a fire on the coal face he
should withdraw the men in that ventilating district.
If he had gas in the ventilating district he should
withdraw the men from the pit. If the gas was there
in the air, and the fire was exposed, he should first of all
attempt to cover up the fire and stop it off temporarily,
but those were conditions which he had not had. In -a
case like that he should split his air to deal with the fire.
In their own case, whatever the conditions had been,
the ventilation had been so arranged as to come to the
fire without carrying on the main body of the air.

Witness said that, in the case referred to by Mr.
Mottram, the object of keeping the men at work simply
was to keep the face working.

Answering Mr. Smith, witness said that the fact of
having a paraffiny smell would not tell him that there
was a fire. The indication was through the smell, but
they could get a stink without a variation of tempera-
ture. It depended on what stage the fire had got to.
They got a sweet smell or a smell of fungi, like the
smell of mushrooms, or a paraffiny smell, and the
chances were that when they got a paraffiny smell there
was a fire.

In further evidence, witness mentioned that they had
had 64 fires inclusive of recurrences. Most of them had
been in the shaft pillar and coal in the breaks. Breaks
took place there, and they filled the fire out, and
possibly in six months they might get another fire on
the same spot.

Witness said they used electric lamps, and he preferred
them very much; they were much better lamps, and he
thought they were safer.

As to coaldust, they had a system of ripping roads as
soon as possible, and so dealing with the packs that the
dust which came down decomposed, and was spread
over the road, so there was a fair amount of stonedust
at Brodsworth before the use of stcnedust was taken to.
The top coal was buried very quickly.

Mr. Greensmith said that in the last fire they had
there were about 30 props in a goaf of possibly 60 yards.
They found about 30 props in this road which was
driven down. This was a fall to face, and was
different from an ordinary case where they went to the
back and found a prop standing. A notice had been
put up in the lamp cabin at the pithead stating that in
the event of a man not being able to extract a prop
reasonably, if he reported to an official the company
would deal with it—that was to say, additional packs
were put there so that they could get it out.

In answer to Mr. Rhodes, witness said that unless he
could ensure the fire being fed by absolutely fresh air
he would not consider it safe to work, and until he
could short-circuit the air he would stop the rest of the
mine.

Witness said they had encountered natural oil in the
coal, and it smelt like corf grease. He added that the
men did not seem to appreciate the importance of with-
drawing the timber, or the majority of them, from the
fact that in driving scourings or headings, or anything
in the way of cutting back in the goaf, they still found
timber.

(To be continued.}

THE FREIGHT MARKET.

The volume of business being done in the outward
freight market this week is somewhat less than usual. On
the north-east aoast, coasting rates are based on from 3s. to
3s. 3d. from Tyne to London, and from 3s. 3d. to 3s. 6d. to
Hamburg. The Baltic is worth from 4s. 9d. to 5s. to Libau.
The Bay is quoted at from 4s. 6d. to 4s. 9d. to St. Nazaire,
and 5s. to Bordeaux ; the Mediterranean to Genoa at from
6s. 10|d. to 7s. 3d. At South Wales chartering is slow, and
the week opened out with moderate enquiries at fairly
steady rates. Coasting business is relatively brisk. The
Clyde market is dull, with rates easy, very little being done
from Humber. Homewards, New York advices report a
moderate amount of chartering, at rates on a low level and
spot tonnage ample to cover requirements. The forward
tone is better, orders being more numerous. The Far
Eastern market is dull, with rates unaltered, and the same
applies to Australia. There is increasing enquiry and a
brighter outlook at the Black Sea and district. The
Mediterranean and ore ports are steady, as is also the
Baltic. The River Plate is easy for prompt shipment, but
with improving tendency for March positions.

Tyne to Algiers, 1,700,6s.; Barletta, 2,500,8s.; Bordeaux,
3,000, 5s.; Barcelona, 2,500, 7s. 6d.; Bagnoli, 4,800, 7s. 3d.;
Boulogne, 1,600, 3s. 9d.; Genoa, 4,500, 7s.; 4,000, 7s.; 5,500,
7s.; 5,000, 6s. 10|d.; 5,000, 7s. 3d.; Gibraltar, 2,100, 6s._.
500; Holtenau, 1,600, 4s. 6d.; Hamburg, 2,000, 3s. 4|d.;
3,000, 3s. 4|d.; 1,700, 3s. 6d.; 2,600, 3s. 3d.; Havre, 1,700,
4s. 3d., two loading places; 2,000, 4s., from Dunston;
Islands, 2,400, 6s. 6d.; Kiel, 2,000, 4s. 3d.; Libau, 1,600,
4s. 9d.; 2,000, 5s. 3d.; London, 1,500, 3s. 3d.; 1,400, 3s.;
2,000, 3s.; Lisbon, 6s. . 3d.; Las Palmas, 3,000, 6s. 6d.,
reported ; 3.600, 7s.; 2,400, 6s. 6d.; Nantes, 4,000, 4s. 10|d.;
2,000, 5s.; Nice, 3,000, 7s. 3d.; 3,000, 7s. 6d.; Naples, 3,600,
7s.; Oran, 3,000, 6s. ; Oporto, 1,000, 7s. 6d.; Port Said, 4,500,
7s., from Dunston; Porto Ferrajo, 4,800, 7s ; Piiseus, 4,000,
7s. 3d., 400, two loading places; 4,700, 7s. l|d.; Rouen, 2,000,
4s. 6d.; Rochester, 1,400, 3s. 6d.; Rendsburg. 1,500, 4s. 6d.,
from Dunston ; Savona, 4,500, 7s. ; 3,700, 7s.; 6.400, 6s. 10|d.,
6s. 7id. if 750, special turn of 108 hours ; 3,600, 7s. 6d., coal
and coke, on d.w.; St. Nazaire, 2,800, 4s. 6d.; 4 000, 4s. 9d.;
Santander, 1,600, 5s. 10|d. ; Spezzia, 4,500, 7s.; Servola,
5,000, 7s. 9d.; 5,600, 7s. 6d., from Dunston ; 5,500, 5?. 9d. ;
Teneriffe, 3,000, 6s. 6d.; Toulon, 1,700, 7s.; Zeebrugge,
2,000, 3s. l|d.

Cardiff to Algiers, 4,200, 7 fr.; Aden, 7,000, 8s. 9d., free
brokerage, end February ; 5,000, 9s., early March ; Alexan-
dria, 5,000, 7s. 3d., early March; 5,000, 7s., February 27;
Antwerp, 1,900, 4s.; Bilbao, 2,200, 5s. 3d.; Bordeaux, 2,000,
5| fr., 500; Brest, 1,600,3s. 9d.; 1,400, 4s.; Brindisi, 5,100,
7s. 3d., 500, 6s. 9d., 800, end February ; Barcelona, 2,300,
7s. 6d.; 3,500, 7s. 6d.; Colombo, 5,000, 8s. 6d., Admiralty;
Corunna, 2,300, 5s. 3d.; Calais, 2,800, 4s.; 3,100, 3s. 10|d.;