1060 THE COLLIERY GUARDIAN. May 23, 1913. continue it. The supply of gas was exhausted, and the dust was too intermixed with stonedust to allow of its con- tinuing the explosion. For an analysis of the sample taken (when an entry was made to the recovered workings) in 19’s crossgate below 19’s landing, showed it to contain 80*81 per cent, of ash*, and the dust was very coarse, only 10*52 per cent, passing through a 100-mesh sieve. Probably the same explanation holds good in respect of the dying out of the blast coming out by 14 level. A sample of dust from this level at the foot of 19’s crossgate was shown to contain 48 31 per cent, of ash. As to the cause of the explosion. I think the fire which originated some years ago in the neighbourhood of the fault had never been completely eradicated, but gave occasional evidence of its existence, and that as the coal was worked off against the fault a great cavity formed, both fire and cavity keeping pace with the extraction of the coal, that an incipient explosion had occurred previously—viz., on January 20, 1912, and that the condition of affairs on Monday night provided just the combination of circum- stances necessary to cause an explosion on a more extended scale—viz., the effective sealing off of the exit from the fire area, but the failure to seal off the inlet, allowing of the accumulation of an explosive mixture, and a vent for the consequent explosion. That Mr. Chambers’ instructions were well conceived for effectually sealing off the affected area and were of the nature set out in an earlier part of this report, I believe to be the case, but I do not believe these instructions were carried out in their entirety. Who blundered I do not know. Mr. Bury, being dead, cannot appear in his defence. I refrain from attaching blame to anyone in particular. The Second Explosion. The second explosion seems to have travelled wholly along the face—not to have divided—as there were no signs of force or burning out of 64’s or 19’s gates, or along 19’s level or 19’s crossgate other than were occasioned by the first explcsion. The injury from supposed burning thought to have been occasioned in respect of one of the men, Birch, who was rescued after the second explosion—he said he had been burnt on the back—I found to have been due to the heat of the breathing apparatus (the injury was about the size of a florin). Birch was with Mr. Pickering’s party, none of whom showed signs of burning. As to the exact route taken by the explosion south of 19’s gate there is no evidence. Mr. Robinson did not find it possible to travel the part of the face south of 19’s gate; Fisher and Hulley traversed this part but did not notice anything of particular importance, and all that it is possible to be positive about is that the explosion took a southerly direction, and came out by 14’s level. Hulley informed Mr. Bobinson that the force of the explosion spent itself in 14’s level and did not go along the crossgate for 131’s and 153’s, neither did it go along 13’s. It may be that there was a large accumulation of gas on the “ rise ” side of the district after the first explosion, which, igniting at the fire, burnt more or less quietly up and down the face until an explosive mixture was formed at about 14’s level, when it detonated. The force in 14 level was very much greater than in the first explosion. The greatest evidence of burning was along the face also. The flame in the second explosion extended nearly to the end of 14 level, or it may be that, seeing that the purest and consequently the most dangerous coaldust undoubtedly existed at the face, the explosion followed that route in consequence. Had it actually extended far on to the plane, I think it is probable that the whole colliery would have been wrecked by a great explosion, as the analyses of the samples of dust marked A, B, taken by Mr. Mottram—B from the south plane, 14 yards top of south side of 14’s level; and A, from south plane, just below 33 level—point to a dangerous condition of dust. See also report on samples submitted for test on July 31. I consider that the facts which I have stated above are eloquent testimony to the value of an inert dust—acting, as it does, as an adulterant to the coal dust—as a pre- ventative to the spread of a colliery explosion. The Rescue Operations. I have formed a decided opinion in respect of the rescue operations. Whilst there was provided at the colliery as fine a body of men trained in rescue work as one could wish to see, the organisation at the mine on the occasion of these explosions was most defective. When Mr. Witty made his arrangements at the surface, he should have issued instructions prohibiting the descent into the mine of all persons unprovided with a written authorisation to do so. He should also have placed a guard at the outbye end of the south plane to prevent the entry into that district of unauthorised persons from other parts of the mine. Had this been done the loss of life occasioned by the second explosion would, I am sure, have been much less heavy. The further question as to whether the work of recovering and bringing out the bodies should have been undertaken * These samples were analysed by Dr. Wheeler, the chief chemist at the Home Office Experimental Station at Eskmeals, Cumberland. at this stage is one in respect of which there will doubtless be differences of opinion. I have no doubt on the point* I know that sentiment weighs heavily in the consideration of a problem of this nature, and that there is an intense desire on the part of relatives of the dead to see and bury the bodies. I do not think, however, that the management of a colliery is justified in allowing persons to risk their lives in order to recover and bring out dead bodies, for that such a procedure is always attended by the great risk of a second explosion when a fire is known to exist underground after an explosion is evidenced by case after case. Instances may be cited in which the bodies have been recovered after an explosion of this nature (e.g, Jamage Colliery). I agree, but it is a race with death. It is hard, however, to make people realise this, and so strong may feeling run on these occasions that it sometimes requires a higher moral courage to resist a natural impulse and prohibit persons from undertaking (and undertaking oneself) a risk of this nature, than to allow the risk to be undertaken. I should also remark that great difficulty was experienced in obtaining a correct number of the casualties; this was not definitely ascertained for three days after the disaster owing to the indiscriminate issue of lamps after the first explosion. This was a very regrettable incident, and one which emphasises the necessity of strict discipline on these occasions. Should the Persons in the District have been Withdrawn pending the Complete Isolation of the Fire Area during the Week-end and on Monday Morning ? I have arrived at the conclusion that pending the com- plete isolation by stowage and stoppings, all the men not engaged in combatting the fire should have been with- drawn from the district in which it occurred. It was stated that to do this would be dangerous, for, it was stated, if the face is allowed to stand fires break out. I cannot accept this, and, in my opinion, no reason which will bear investiga- tion has been advanced in support of this contention. The Cause of Spontaneous Combustion at the Cadeby Colliery. Valuable evidence was given by Mr. W. H. Chambersand Mr. J. E. B. Wilson, on the subject of the cause of spon- taneous combustion at the Cadeby Main Colliery, and I give in the Appendix a precis of their opinions. On the general question, however, of spontaneous combustion and the precautions which should be taken in the interests of safety when combatting gob fires, I forbear to express any opinion pending the results of the enquiry now being con- ducted by the Departmental Committee on Spontaneous Combustion in Mines. Extinguishing Fire by the Application of Inert Gases. The credit of carrying into practical effect the idea of extinguishing gob fires by forcing an inert gas into an isolated fire area belongs to Mr. Chambers, and its further application is worthy of the serious consideration of mining engineers. Breaches of the Coal Mines Act. I am glad not to have to report any breaches of the Coal Mines Act as contributing to the cause of any of the explosions. I should like to state that the management of the colliery did all that they could to assist me in my enquiry, and that in the examination of witnesses I was ably assisted by the representatives of the workmen. I cannot conclude this report without recording my sense of the magnitude of the loss which the Mines Department has sustained in the death of three of its inspectors. Mr* Tickle was a most promising junior inspector, and was, I know, held in high esteem by Mr. Pickering. Mr. Hewitt was a careful and experienced inspector. By Mr. Pickering’s death the country is deprived of one of its most capable and devoted public servants, and I personally have to mourn the loss of a most able colleague and a loyal and valued friend. There are appendices to the report containing a list of the killed, samples of the atmosphere taken between the explosions, analyses of dust samples by Dr. Wheeler, an account of the organisation of rescue brigades at the colliery, and the summary of Mr. Chambers’ and Mr. Wilson’s evidence with reference to spontaneous com- bustion and gob fires. These are held over until next week. (To be continued.} Hull Coal Exports.—The official return of the exports of coal from Hull for the week ending Tuesday, May 13,1913 is as follows:—Antwerp, 944 tons ; Amsterdam, 856; Alexandria, 8,419; Bremen, 1,717; Bombay, 163; Copen- hagen, 567; Calais, 1,716; Cronstadt, 8,452; Gothenburg. 1,973; Ghent, 489; Hamburg, 2,420; Harlingen, 1,385* Harburg, 2,619; Kalmar, 1,257; Kiel, 1,094; Karachi, 268; Libau, 2,918; Newfairwater, 200; Norrkoping, 595; Odense, 1,587; Oxelosund, 831; Palermo, 5,016; Pernau, 2,793; Reval, 4,326; Rotterdam, 4,616 ; Reykjavik, 1,156; Rouen, 8,712; Biga, 7,841; St. Petersburg, 7,557; Stockholm, 601; Stettin, 3,036 ; Windau, 1,165; total, 87,289 tons. Corre- sponding period 1912, 77,883 tons; 1911, 91,246 tons; 1910, 87,056 tons. COMPRESSED-AIR PIT LOCOMOTIVES * By T. Giller. During the past few years considerable progress has been made in the construction of compressed-air loco- motives for use in mines, especially in connection with the pressure at which the air tanks are charged, it having been recognised that the use of increased pres- sure enlarges the radius of action of the locomotive, or enables the same duty to be performed with much smaller tanks, besides affording greatei* security in the event of the driver neglecting to have the tanks recharged at the proper time. The early locomotives were con- structed for a charging pressure of 30 atmospheres, which was gradually increased in course of time to 60 atmospheres; and quite recently it has been found practicable to employ charging pressures of 100 to 150 atmospheres, by using seamless steel tanks. In Germany, tanks of this type have been approved by the Mines Department, for standing a charging pressure of 150 atmospheres in a number of instances where the loco- motives have been compounded on reconstruction (fig. 1), with ihe result that the engines have been enabled to make, for instance, three double trips, instead of two as formerly, before recharging. Against this advantage must be set the drawback that increasing the pressure in the compressor from 115 to 165 atmospheres (these pressures corresponding to charging pressures of 100 and 150 atmospheres respec- tively) entails an increased consumption of power amounting to 9*6 per cent. On the other hand, the author has ascertained that only a fraction of this increased consumption of power is actually lost, because the relatively high temperature of pit air largely counteracts the lowering of temperature and diminution in volume caused by the throttling action of the reducing valve. He is therefore of opinion that the charging pressure for compound locomotives should be at least 130 atmospheres, whilst 150 atmospheres is still better. Before proceeding further with the question of the locomotive itself, it may be well to devote a few words to the compressors and air mains, as forming an integral part of the system of locomotive haulage by compressed air. Even at the time the charging pressure did not exceed 60 atmospheres, multiple-stage compressors were already known, three stages being used for pressures up to 60 atmospheres, four stages for up to 100 atmospheres, and five stages for still higher pressures. Although some makers consider four-stage compressors suitable for 130 atmospheres pressure, it is really not desirable to exceed the ratio of 1 : 2*8 to 1.3 in each stage, since when these conditions are observed the air temperature is not unduly raised, and the air valves have a much longer working life ; and, besides, in the event of any one stage getting out of order, the work can still be safely carried on with the others. In addition, the leakage losses between the several stages are smaller. In comparison with these great advantages, the small cylinder diameter (2 to 3| inches) of the fifth stage, and its two small valves are of no moment with reference to the mechanical efficiency. Finally, the floor space occupied by a five-stage compressor is not very much greater than in the case of one of the four-stage type. One of these compressors, operated by live steam, is illustrated in fig. 2, and they may also be direct-coupled to an electromotor, or driven from the latter by belting as shown in fig. 3. In the absence of steam, or where cheap current is available, one or other of the two latter methods is indicated, provided the plant is in fairly constant work, and there is therefore no risk of setting up rushes of current in the main circuit through frequent stopping and restarting the motor. When steam is available this is the best form of motive power under normal working conditions, because the speed, and therefore the output, can be varied to suit the needs of the case in a highly simple manner,. free from any complications. Exhaust steam is the cheapest form, and experience has amply demonstrated the reliable working of compressors operated in this way. In some cases three-stage compressors have been installed for high pressures, the air being drawn from the ordinary compressed air mains of the pit (five to six atmospheres pressure) ; but this is not an advisable practice, since the pressure in these mains is liable to fluctuation according to the demands of the ordinary service, and consequently the output of the high-pressure compressor varies, and any stoppage of the low-pressure plant will interrupt the haulage. It is far preferable to incur the additional outlay and keep the high-pressure plant entirely separate from the low-pressure plant. With regard to spare sets, a complete unit is desirable, but if economy has to be observed increased security of working can be attained by employing a double cylinder * From a paper read before the Ruhr District Section of the Society of German Engineers.